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Crawford and Beyond:  Exploring the 
Future of the Confrontation Clause in 
Light of Its Past 
INTRODUCTION 
Robert M. Pitler† 
On February 18th, 2005, the Brooklyn Law School Moot 
Court Room was filled to capacity by some three hundred 
people from across the country attending an all-day program, 
“Crawford and Beyond: Exploring the Future of the 
Confrontation Clause in Light of Its Past.”  The Crawford in 
the title, of course, refers to the Supreme Court’s landmark 
decision in Crawford v. Washington,1 decided less than a year 
earlier. 
THE MAJORITY OPINION 
Authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the seven-justice 
Crawford majority opinion abandons the too “subjective” and 
“unpredictable”2 “indicia of reliability” framework of Ohio v. 
Roberts,3 which for nearly twenty-five years had governed 
  
 † Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.  The author gratefully 
acknowledges the invaluable assistance of Charles Krause, research assistants Michael 
Pasinkoff and Jennifer Diana, and the Brooklyn Law School research and reference 
librarians.  © 2005 Robert M. Pitler. 
 1 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 2 Id. at 63. 
 3 448 U.S. 56 (1980).  Under Roberts, a hearsay statement satisfies the 
“indicia of reliability criteria” if, without more, it fits “within a firmly rooted hearsay 
exception” or if the statement has “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”  Id. 
at 66.  Roberts could easily be read to require a showing of declarant’s unavailability in 
order to admit a hearsay statement against a criminal defendant.  Id. at 65, 66 
(“[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the 
Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable.”).  See 2 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 252 at 123-24 (J. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999).  As the result 
of the decisions in United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 395 (1986) and White v. Illinois, 
502 U.S. 346, 353-55 (1992) the Court moved away from or clarified the unavailability 
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Confrontation Clause challenges to the admissibility of 
nontestifying declarants’ hearsay statements at criminal trials.   
The Crawford majority is dissatisfied with the indicia of 
reliability framework because of its proven capacity for and 
“unpardonable vice” of leading lower courts to admit the very 
kind of uncross-examined hearsay statements of a 
nontestifying declarant that the Confrontation Clause was 
designed to exclude, such as prior trial testimony, grand jury 
testimony, guilty plea colloquies, and custodial confessions of 
accomplices.4  According to Crawford, confrontation requires 
cross-examination of a hearsay declarant, not a judicial inquiry 
into the reliability of a hearsay statement.5  As Justice Scalia 
pithily puts it, “[d]ispensing with confrontation because 
testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury 
trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.”6 
In support of replacing the Roberts reliability 
framework with a more categorical approach, Justice Scalia 
describes the evil that the Confrontation Clause sought to 
address.  According to Justice Scalia, that evil was the 
admission of statements by nontestifying witnesses obtained 
through ex parte examinations (some conducted by 
considerably less benign methods than others).7  These 
  
requirement, apparently leaving untouched its application to prior testimony.  Little, if 
any, of the requirement was left, however, with respect to firmly-rooted hearsay 
exceptions, which do not require a showing of unavailability, such as the twenty-three 
in Federal Rule of Evidence 803.  See Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation 
Clause and Hearsay Doctrine Under the Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 
1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 711 n.96.   
 4 541 U.S. at 63-65. 
 5 Id. at 61-62 (citations omitted). 
 6 Id. at 62. 
 7 Id. at 50.  In at least four places, the Crawford majority points to Sir 
Walter Raleigh’s 1603 treason trial as involving a prototypical confrontation violation.  
See 541 U.S. at 44, 50, 52, 62.  At his trial, Raleigh futilely demanded at least thrice 
that his alleged co-conspirator and principal, if not only, accuser, Lord Cobham, appear 
at trial, face Raleigh, and repeat his out-of-court, ex parte-examination statement, as 
well as the contents of a letter Cobham had written to Raleigh.  See The Trial of Sir 
Walter Raleigh, in 2 COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR 
HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO 
THE PRESENT TIME 1, 15-16, 23 (T.B. Howell ed., 1816) [hereinafter HOW. ST. TR.].  It is 
likely that torture or threats of torture were used to secure oral or written statements 
of other witnesses against Raleigh.  See, e.g., id. at 19, 22 (Privy Council commissioner 
Lord Howard acknowledging that a witness had been told that he deserved the rack, 
but that this was not a threat; and another commissioner, Sir Wade, acknowledging 
having “taught” a conspirator “his lesson” during an examination); see also, JAMES 
FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 325 (London, 
Macmillan 1883) (stating that suspects and accomplices in Privy Council cases were 
tortured). The record is silent as to the torture, if any, of Cobham.  It appears that 
Cobham turned against Raleigh when shown a letter that Raleigh had sent to Lord 
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examinations were conducted under the “civil-law mode of 
criminal procedure”8 as practiced by justices of the peace, 
magistrates, and other officers of the crown in sixteenth, 
seventeenth and, perhaps, early eighteenth century England, 
and in the American colonies, as well.9 
Marshalling English common law and early American 
authority, Justice Scalia seeks to demonstrate that toward the 
end of the seventeenth century, and certainly no later than the 
middle of the eighteenth century, confrontation/cross-
examination requirements with respect to ex parte 
examinations had taken hold in both the mother country10 and 
the colonies (soon to declare themselves independent states).11  
  
Cecil, who was a moving force in the prosecution of Raleigh.  See 1 DAVID JARDINE, 
HISTORICAL CRIMINAL TRIALS 436 (1832).  In addition to the Crawford majority, many 
have observed that the Raleigh case is a forebearer of the Confrontation Clause.  See, 
e.g., Erwin N. Griswold, The Due Process Revolution and Confrontation, 119 U. PA. L. 
REV. 711, 712 (1971) (stating that Raleigh’s trial was the “historical origin” of the Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation Clause).  Others have been more doubtful.  See, e.g., Mural 
A. Larkin, The Right of Confrontation: What Next?, 1 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 67, 70 (1969).  
An informed close observer has described the relationship between the Raleigh trial 
and the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause as “a convenient, but highly romantic 
myth.”  See Kenneth W. Graham Jr., The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: 
Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 100 n.4 (1972). 
  The trial itself, however, is real, and its influence on the Framers well 
within the realm of possibility, as events of that kind can sear ideas into the political 
consciousness and then they are passed on from generation to generation.  Cf. 5 JOHN 
HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1364 at 24 (3d ed. 1940).  Compare The Trial of Sir 
Walter Raleigh, 2 HOW. ST. TR. at 15 (after rejection of his demands that Lord Cobham 
be brought to trial and accuse him to his face, Raleigh reportedly replied that he was 
being tried “by the Spanish Inquisition”), with 2 DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 110-11 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1863) (At the 1788 Massachusetts 
convention to decide whether to ratify the Federal Constitution, delegate Abraham 
Holmes objected to the omission of a constitutional provision detailing the mode of trial 
including “whether [a defendant] is to be allowed to confront the witnesses, and have 
the advantage of cross-examination . . . .”  As a result, Mr. Holmes argued that, in the 
future, it will be revealed that Congress has the power to create judicial procedures 
“little less inauspicious than a certain tribunal in Spain . . . the Inquisition.”).  See 
generally 30 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE §§ 6344-48 at 346-794 [hereinafter WRIGHT & GRAHAM] (a 
thorough, interesting, and imaginative directed exploration of the English, American 
colonial and preratification background of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation 
Clause). 
 8 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50. 
 9 Id. at 43-44, 47-48. 
 10 Id. at 48-50 (citing 1776-83 declarations of rights issued by the recently 
self-declared independent states, the state ratifying conventions and early American 
cases following ratification of the Bill of Rights). 
 11 541 U.S. at 47.  To establish Crawford’s continuity with much older 
vintage decisions, Justice Scalia concludes that “nothing in [nineteenth century] cases 
contradicts our holding in any way . . . .  If nothing else, the test we announce is an 
empirically accurate explanation of the results our cases reached.”  Id. at 59 n.9.  With 
respect to the outcomes of more recent decisions, Justice Scalia also explains that they 
“hew[ed] closely to the traditional [testimonial] line and have thus remained faithful to 
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Given this history, Crawford concludes that a defendant’s right 
to confrontation is violated by admission in evidence of present-
day “testimonial statements” obtained by practices “with 
closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause 
was directed.”12 
Left for another day is “a comprehensive definition of 
‘testimonial.’”13  Still, the opinion expressly states that, at a 
  
the Framers’ understanding.”  Id. at 58-59.  In a footnote, Justice Scalia acknowledges 
that White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, discussed infra note 23, arguably is in tension with 
the approach in Crawford.  541 U.S. at 58 n.8.  Nonetheless, he explains that the Court 
in White “had [taken] as a given” that the statements in issue fell within the relevant 
hearsay exceptions, i.e., excited utterances and statements for the purpose of medical 
diagnosis and treatment, and White only required the Court to decide whether there 
was a constitutional unavailability requirement for statements coming within those 
exceptions.  541 U.S. at 58 n.8 (citing White, 502 U.S. at 348-49, 351 n.4). 
  More notably and most curiously, albeit explicable, is the omission of Idaho 
v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), from recent cases described by Justice Scalia as 
“hew[ing] the traditional [testimonial] line.”  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58.  It seems 
unlikely that Wright was simply overlooked given that Chief Justice Rehnquist 
expressly and solely relied on it as the basis for concluding that Crawford’s wife’s 
statements were not clothed with the then Roberts-required particularized guarantees 
of trustworthiness.  541 U.S. at 76.  In Wright, the Supreme Court upheld the Idaho 
Supreme Court’s decision that the Confrontation Clause had been violated by 
admitting into evidence, under a state residual exception to the hearsay rule, the 
statements of a nontestifying two-and-a-half-year-old child sex abuse victim made in 
response to suggestive questions by a doctor because the statements did not possess the 
Roberts-required particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.  See Wright, 497 U.S. at 
820-24. 
  The facts of record in Wright certainly would have made it fair to infer that 
the doctor posing suggestive questions was doing so at the behest of the police.  See 
Margaret Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal 
for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 603-04 (1992) [hereinafter, 
Berger, Prosecutorial Restraint]; see also Transcript of Oral Argument, 2003 WL 
22705281, at *7-8, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410) (counsel for petitioner states 
that the doctor was acting in cooperation with the police).  Also, it was undisputed that 
the child had spent the night before the interview in police custody.  Wright, 497 U.S. 
at 809.  As a result, the little girl’s statements could have certainly been viewed as 
testimonial and their exclusion would have been faithful to the Framers’ testimonial 
understanding.  The problem, however, is that there is nary a word in the Wright 
opinion that the doctor was a police agent.  See Randolph Jonakait, Commentary: A 
Response to Professor Berger; The Right to Confrontation: Not a Mere Restraint on 
Government. 76 MINN. L. REV. 615, 618-19 (1992).  Nor is there any suggestion that the 
two-and-a-half-year-old victim in Wright knew or understood the significance of 
making statements to the “police” even though she had spent the night before at the 
stationhouse.  497 U.S. at 825-27.  So viewed, the exclusion of the nontestifying child’s 
nontestimonial statement could not be seen as “hew[ing] the traditional [testimonial] 
line” unless the Confrontation Clause required cross-examination of nontestimonial 
statements (i.e. the child to the doctor), a result probably not favored by Justice Scalia.  
See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 143 (1999) (Scalia, J. concurring); White, 502 U.S. at 
364-66 (Thomas, J. concurring, joined by Scalia, J.).  Perhaps this explains the 
omission of Wright from the Crawford majority opinion. 
 12 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
 13 Id. Without choosing among them, the Crawford majority mentions at 
least three different formulations of the core class of testimonial statements:  “ex parte 
in-court testimony or its functional equivalent – that is, material such as affidavits, 
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minimum, the testimonial category includes prior testimony at 
a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial, 
and statements made during “police interrogation.”14  These 
statements are admissible only if the declarant is unavailable 
to testify at trial15 and the defendant had the opportunity to 
cross-examine the declarant when he or she made the 
statement,16 or if the declarant “appears for cross-examination” 
during the trial at which the statement is offered.17  Also, as 
  
custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-
examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be 
used prosecutorially” . . . “extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized 
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or 
confessions” . . . and “statements that were made under circumstances which would 
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available 
for use at a later trial.”  Id. at 51-52 (citations omitted).  According to the majority, 
these formulations share a common nucleus and the majority defines the 
“[Confrontation] Clause’s coverage at various levels of abstractions around [the 
nucleus].”  Id. at 52.  The abstraction, however, ought to be read in light of other 
confrontation principles articulated by the majority.  For example, the manner in 
which the particular statements have been obtained should bear close kinship to the 
abuses that gave rise to the Confrontation Clause.  Id. at 68.  In addition, any 
testimonial formulation should take account of Crawford’s emphasis on involvement of 
governmental officers in producing testimonial evidence.  See 541 U.S. at 53, 56 n.7. 
 14 Id.  The majority characterizes guilty plea colloquy statements as “plainly 
testimonial.”  Id. at 64-65.  Curiously, however, plea colloquy statements are not 
included within the enumerated types of statements that, at a minimum, comprise the 
testimonial category, set forth at the end of the opinion.  See id. at 68.  After Crawford, 
without referring to this omission, courts have encountered no difficulty concluding 
that plea colloquy statements are testimonial.  See, e.g., United States v. McClain, 377 
F.3d 219, 222 (2d Cir. 2004); People v. Hardy, 824 N.E.2d 953, 957 (N.Y. 2005).  To the 
extent that a guilty plea has an existence independent of the allocution it, too, has been 
held to be testimonial.  See United States v. Massino, 319 F. Supp. 2d 295, 298-99 
(E.D.N.Y. 2004).  More than 100 years before Crawford, a judgment of conviction of one 
person offered as evidence against another person had been held to violate the 
Confrontation Clause.  See Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899).  It is not self-
evident why a judgment is testimonial, although it is hearsay in need of an exception.  
The federal hearsay exception for previous convictions incorporates the Kirby principle.  
See FED. R. EVID. 803 (22). 
 15 The Crawford decision does not impact the principles governing the 
meaning of unavailability, in particular those requiring reasonable good faith 
prosecutorial efforts to secure the presence of the declarant to testify.  See, e.g., Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 73-77 (1980); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 209-12 (1972); 
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968). 
 16 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
 17 Id. at 60 n.9 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970)) (finding 
no confrontation violation occasioned by the introduction of the witness’ prior cross-
examined preliminary hearing testimony that was inconsistent with that witness’ trial 
testimony); see also United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559-60 (1988) (emphasizing 
that the Confrontation Clause guarantees only an opportunity for effective cross-
examination; thus, there was no violation of the confrontation right by the introduction 
of the memory-challenged witness-victim’s out-of-court photographic identification of 
defendant because the victim had testified under oath and responded willingly on 
cross-examination, enabling defense counsel to elicit relevant information from the 
victim, such as his bad memory); see generally Mosteller, supra note 3, at 724-36. 
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the majority makes crystal clear, the Confrontation Clause 
does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes 
other than proving the truth of the facts asserted in the 
statement.18  
Sprinkled throughout the majority opinion are little 
confrontation bits and not-so-little confrontation morsels.  
These bits and morsels describe characteristics of testimonial 
and nontestimonial statements, as well as other significant 
factors that will affect admissibility under the Confrontation 
Clause.  
The Court leaves no doubt that statements made in 
response to police interrogation can be testimonial since those 
interrogations “bear a striking resemblance to examinations by 
Justices of the Peace in England.”19  Although the majority 
opinion recognizes, as it does with “testimonial,”20 that there 
can be several different definitions of “interrogations,” it 
refrains from choosing one.21  Rather, the Court simply states 
that the custodial statement of Crawford’s wife Sylvia, which 
was knowingly given in response to structured police 
questioning, qualifies under any conceivable definition of 
interrogation.22 
Thus, the testimonial police-interrogation subcategory 
includes accomplice and co-conspirator statements knowingly 
made to the police during structured custodial questioning,23 
  
 18 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 n.9 (citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 413-
14 (1985)) (no confrontation violation by the introduction of accomplice’s confession, 
which had been introduced to rebut defendant’s claim that his own confession was a 
sheriff-coerced copy of that of the accomplice, not for the truth of the facts asserted in 
it.  The only issues were what the accomplice said and what the sheriff did.  Both of 
those questions could be addressed by cross-examining the trial-testifying sheriff who 
had first-hand knowledge of what had been said and done.). 
 19 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. 
 20 See 541 U.S. at 68; see supra note 13. 
 21 541 U.S. at 53 n.4.  The majority does state that it is using interrogation in 
its “colloquial, rather than its technical legal sense” with a cf. citation to Rhode Island 
v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980).  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4.  At the cited pages, 
the Innis Court defined interrogation for Miranda purposes to include express 
questioning or its functional equivalent, i.e., “any words or actions on the part of the 
police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response.”  Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01.  Despite this language, Innis says that the 
standard is an objective one, focusing on the perspective of the defendant, although the 
intent of the police may, in some limited circumstances, be relevant.  See id. 
 22 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4. 
 23 See id. at 40, 41, 65 (noting that Crawford’s wife may have facilitated the 
stabbing and that she herself was a suspect); id. at 56, 58, (citing with approval Lilly v. 
Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 134 (1999) (plurality opinion) (all nine justices seemingly 
agreed that the introduction of an accomplice’s stationhouse confession to the police 
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and perhaps noncustodial, structured questioning as well.  
Though not expressly recognized by the Crawford majority, 
statements of informants may be testimonial.  Informant 
statements can be so characterized because they were part and 
parcel of the civil law mode of ex parte examination in the 
prosecution of smuggling cases in the Vice Admiralty courts in 
America, to which the majority made express reference.24 
Witnesses’ statements, including those of young 
children, may also be testimonial when made in knowing 
response to structured police questioning, as the text of a 
Crawford footnote clearly implies, albeit in dicta.25  A witness’ 
statement may be testimonial even if it fits within a modern-
day exception to the hearsay rule, e.g., an excited utterance.26  
The majority opinion, however, cannot be read to say that 
every police question is an interrogation; nor is every answer 
testimonial. 
A common thread running throughout the majority 
opinion is concern with government-created (elicited) 
testimony.  As stated by the majority opinion:  “[I]nvolvement 
  
can violate the Confrontation Clause)).  See also supra note 21 (suggesting that express 
questioning is not required). 
 24 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 48 (testimony was routinely taken by deposition 
or private judicial examination).  As for the use of informants in American Vice 
Admiralty courts, see, for example, WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 6345 at 489, 
502, 503 n.506, 504 n.509, 536-41.  The manner of Admiralty prosecution and 
enforcement was a major, if not obsessive, concern of the colonists-turned-
revolutionists.  See id. § 6345 at 483-540. 
 25 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8 (describing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 
349-51 (1992) as arguably in tension with a rule requiring a prior opportunity for cross-
examination in order to introduce a testimonial statement of a nontestifying witness).  
The statement in White v. Illinois was that of an allegedly sexually abused four-year-
old girl made during a police interview at her home some fifty minutes after the alleged 
abuse.  See People v. White, 555 N.E.2d 1241, 1243-46 (Ill. App. 1990) (Under Illinois 
law, the four-year-old’s statement was admissible as a spontaneous statement because 
it related to a startling event and it was made while the declarant was under the stress 
of excitement caused by that event.).  To Justice Scalia, “[i]t is questionable whether 
testimonial statements would even have been admissible on that ground in 1791; to the 
extent the hearsay exception for spontaneous declarations existed at all, it required 
that the statements be made ‘immediately upon the hurt received, and before the 
declarant had time to devise or contrive anything for her own advantage.’”  Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 58 n.8 (quoting Thompson v. Trevanion, (1694) 90 Eng. Rep. 179 (K.B.)).  
Though somewhat ambiguous, footnote 8 certainly implies that a statement like the 
one involved in the 1694 case either would be a historical exception to confrontation or 
nontestimonial in nature because, under the circumstances, the declarant was not 
bearing testimony.  Put another way, a 1694-like spontaneous res gestae non-narrative 
statement is not akin to the ex parte examination evils at which the confrontation right 
is directed.  A modern day excited utterance, not made contemporaneously with the 
exciting event but a narrative of it in response to structured police questioning, may 
arguably be a next of kin. 
 26 See 541 U.S. at 58 n.8, discussed supra note 25. 
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of government officers in the production of testimony with an 
eye toward trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial 
abuse – a fact borne out time and again throughout a history 
with which the Framers were keenly familiar.”27 
The majority acknowledges that “an accuser who makes 
a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a 
sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an 
acquaintance does not.”28  Giving as an example “[a]n off-hand, 
  
 27 Id. at 56 n.7. 
 28 See id. at 51.  “Imagine and consider if you will,” Rod Serling, The Twilight 
Zone (CBS television broadcast 1959-1964), the 1603 treason prosecution of Sir Walter 
Raleigh for conspiring, inter alia, to overthrow James I and replace him with a female 
cousin, to bring Roman Catholicism to England, and to have foreign powers invade the 
country, all to be financed by the King of Spain and the Archduke of Austria.  See 2 
HOW. ST. TR. at 1-3.  At the trial, a prosecution witness, one Dyer, a pilot, testified in 
person (apparently the only one to do so) that: 
I came to a merchant’s house in Lisbon, to see a boy that I had there; there 
came a gentleman into the house, and enquiring what countryman I was, I 
said, an Englishman.  Whereupon he asked me, if the king was crowned?  
And I answered, No, but that I hoped he should be so shortly.  Nay, saith he, 
he shall never be crowned; for Don Raleigh and Don Cobham will cut his 
throat ere that day come. 
Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, 2 HOW. ST. TR. at 25. 
  In one reported version of the trial, Raleigh responded by stating, “What 
infer you upon this?”  2 HOW. ST. TR. at 25.  In a later version, Raleigh reportedly said, 
“This is the saying of some wild Jesuit or beggerly Priest; but what proof is it against 
me?”  JARDINE, supra note 7, at 436.  The Attorney General (Sir Edward Coke) replied 
to Raleigh, “That your treason hath wings.”  Id. at 436; see also 2 HOW ST. TR., supra 
note 7, at 25 (“That your treason had wings.”).  The first edition of State Trial Reports 
was published in 1719 and several editions followed.  See 12 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, 
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 127-30 (2d ed. 1938); see also JARDINE, supra note 7, at 
400.  Jardine explains that his 1824 edition relies on previously unavailable 
manuscripts.  Id.  Perhaps it is an overly-suspicious nature, but this later edition 
seems to be written in a more modern style than the earlier versions, and that raises 
questions.  But see WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 6342 at 261 n.559 (agreeing 
with Jardine that the manuscript upon which he relies “is the most accurate and 
complete”). 
  Unlike his demand to be accused to his face by Lord Cobham, see supra 
note 7 and accompanying text, Raleigh made no similar demand with respect to the 
pilot Dyer.  Perhaps by Raleigh’s rhetorical inquiry with respect to Dyer’s testimony, 
“what infer you by this?”, id. at 25, he was simply arguing the absence of probative 
value or a hearsay point because the gentleman’s statement to Dyer was “no evidence.”  
See 2 HOW. ST. TR. at 20 (where Raleigh made other hearsay points); JARDINE, supra 
note 7, at 429 (another hearsay point).  Could it be that in 1603, prescient Sir Walter 
recognized the difference between the hearsay of an unavailable private person’s out-
of-court statement offered for its truth by the prosecution, and the offer by the 
prosecution of government secured, ex parte-examined statements and letters of an 
available coconspirator?  Finally, Attorney General Coke, was up to Raleigh’s hearsay 
challenge, if that it be, and in effect responded that the out-of-court statement of the 
gentleman in Portugal was offered not for its truth, but only that it had been said in 
Portugal, and thus the conspiracy was an active one.  See 2 HOW. ST. TR. at 25.  Upon 
conviction, Raleigh was sentenced to death; he spent the next fourteen years in the 
Tower of London, writing a History of the World and dabbling with chemistry.  
Subsequently, the King temporarily paroled him and sent him on a mission to mine 
gold in Guyana, incurring the wrath of the Spanish.  The quest failed and, upon his 
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overheard remark” that might be unreliable evidence, and thus 
a good candidate for exclusion under the hearsay rule, the 
majority opinion expressly states that not all hearsay 
implicates the Confrontation Clause.29  Such an off-handed 
remark, notes the majority, bears little resemblance to the 
civil-law abuses targeted by the Confrontation Clause.30 
The Court also mentions some common hearsay 
statements that would not be testimonial.  The majority 
opinion goes out of its way to expressly state that both business 
records and statements in furtherance of a conspiracy are not 
testimonial.31  A private individual’s statement to another 
  
return to England, Raleigh was executed.  See 2 HOW. ST. TR. at 31-33; JARDINE, supra 
note 7, at 476-79. 
 29 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 56; accord id. at 76 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).  In his dissent, the 
Chief Justice gave the majority credit for excluding from the testimonial category 
business and “official” records.  Id. at 76 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).  The majority, 
however, mentions only business records.  Id. at 56.  This divergence in views leaves 
open the extent to which public records, in particular law enforcement reports and 
records, are nontestimonial.  Like the business records of private enterprise, many 
public records and reports, including those of law enforcement, seem far removed from 
the evil civil-law ex parte examinations that lie at the core of Crawford.  Interestingly, 
in 1974, relying on “confrontation concerns” about adversarial information contained in 
police reports expressed by members of the House of Representatives, see 120 CONG. 
REC. 2387-88 (remarks of Reps. Brasco, Dennis, Holtzman, Hunt Johnson, & Smith); S. 
REP. NO. 93-1277, at 17 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7064, the 
Congress amended Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(B) to exclude as hearsay 
certain law enforcement reports and records sought to be introduced as a public record 
in criminal cases.  FED. R. EVID. 803(8); see H.R. REP. NO. 93-1597, at 11 (1974) (Conf. 
Rep.), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098, 7104-05 (adopting the above-mentioned 
amendment).  The potential breadth of this exclusion has been limited by federal 
decisions holding that the prohibition does not encompass routine, non-adversarial law 
enforcement reports when they do not involve a subjective investigation and evaluation 
of crime.  See United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 66-84 (2d Cir. 1977) (under Rule 
803(8)(B) & (C), error to admit a Customs Service chemist’s work sheets and report 
concluding that the white powdery substance analyzed was heroin).  Moreover, the 
confrontation policy reflected by Rule 803’s special treatment of law enforcement 
reports, “applies with equal force to . . . any of the other exceptions to the hearsay rule.” 
Id. at 78.  Cf., e.g., United States v. Brown, 9 F.3d 907, 911-12 (11th Cir. 1993) 
(Although Rule 803(6) cannot be used as a back door to admit evidence excluded under 
Rule 803(8)(B), a police property clerk receipt for a weapon is a business record within 
the meaning of Rule 803(6) and its admission does not run afoul of the Rule 803(8) 
exclusion for law enforcement reports because the police custodian, as part of his 
routine-everyday function, prepared the property receipt with no incentive to do 
anything other than mechanically record unambiguous information on that receipt.); 
United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789, 793-94 (9th Cir. 1979) (the Rule 803(8)(B) 
exclusion of matters observed by law enforcement personnel was not intended to 
exclude records of routine non-adversarial matters such as these here – customs 
officials recording and entering in a computer the license plate numbers of every 
vehicle passing the border at a particular location, and the computer searching its 
memory to determine whether a license number has appeared within the previous 
seventy-two hours). 
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private party would appear to be nontestimonial,32 as would 
statements unknowingly made to government officers, 
including informants.33 
The majority coyly implies that a testimonial dying 
declaration (one made to a government law enforcement officer) 
may be a sui generis historical exception to the cross-
examination requirement because of its recognition at common 
law.34  The opinion also expresses “acceptance” of a yet-to-be-
defined rule of forfeiture of a confrontation objection to a 
hearsay statement.  This rule “extinguishes confrontation 
claims on essentially equitable grounds.”35  Those grounds are 
  
 32 541 U.S. at 57 (citing with approval Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 81, 87-
89 (1970) (considering reliability factors beyond a prior opportunity for cross-
examination and rejecting a Confrontation Clause challenge to the admission against 
defendant of a co-conspirator’s statement to a fellow inmate under a unique Georgia 
exception to the hearsay rule for statements during the concealment stage of the 
conspiracy)). 
 33 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 (citing with approval Bourjaily v. United States, 
483 U.S. 171, 181-84 (1987)) (describing Bourjaily as “admitt[ing] statements made 
unwittingly to a Federal Bureau of Investigation informant after applying a more 
general test that did not make prior cross-examination an indispensable requirement”). 
 34 Id. at 56 n.6.  To date, the highest state courts in California and Minnesota 
have recognized dying declarations as a sui generis historical exception to confrontation 
right.  See People v. Monterroso, 101 P.3d 956, 972 (Cal. 2004); State v. Martin, 695 
N.W.2d 578, 585 (Minn. 2005).  Contra United States v. Jordan, No. 04-CR-229-B, 2005 
WL 513501, at *3 (D. Colo.) (unpublished opinion).  Rather than an exception to 
testimonial categorical exclusion, the Kansas Supreme Court has held that 
introduction of a dying declaration does not violate confrontation because the accused 
forfeited that right by killing the victim.  See State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789, 793-94 (Kan. 
2004). 
 35 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 (citing with approval Reynolds v. United States, 
98 U.S. 145, 158-59 (1879) (“The Constitution gives the accused the right to a trial at 
which he should be confronted with the witnesses against him; but if a witness is 
absent by [the accused’s] wrongful procurement, he cannot complain if competent 
evidence is admitted to supply the place of that which he has kept away.”)).  The 
Court’s acceptance of forfeiture notwithstanding, open issues remain.  For example, 
identifying the burden of proof governing the determination of whether the defendant 
is responsible for the declarant’s failure to testify, compare, e.g., People v. Geraci, 649 
N.E.2d 817, 821 (N.Y. 1995) (clear and convincing evidence is the standard), with 1997 
Adv. Comm Note to FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) in Preface to 117 S.Ct. 118 (the usual FED. 
R. EVID. 104(a) preponderance of the evidence standard applies to misconduct issues). 
Another issue is whether the defendant must act with the purpose of preventing the 
declarant from testifying, compare People v. Maher, 677 N.E.2d 728, 731 (N.Y. 1997) 
(defendant’s conduct must be for the purpose of preventing the witness from testifying), 
and United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1278-79 (1st Cir. 1996) (intent to prevent 
witness need not be sole motivation), and cf. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (hearsay exception 
for statements made by an unavailable declarant offered against a party who 
intentionally engaged in or acquiesced in wrongdoing that rendered the declarant 
unavailable), with State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789, 792-94 (Kan. 2004) (requiring no intent 
to prevent witness from testifying), and United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364, 
370 (6th Cir. 2005) (same) (even though FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) may require an intent 
to prevent a witness from testifying, the confrontation right does not turn on “vagaries 
of the rules of evidence,” (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61)).  Additionally, there is the 
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present when a declarant is wrongfully prevented from 
testifying by conduct attributed to the defendant.  
The majority muses and teases about nontestimonial 
statements: “Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is 
wholly consistent with the Framers’ design to afford the states 
flexibility in their development of hearsay law – as does 
Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such 
statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether.”36  
The majority refrains, however, from deciding whether there is 
any confrontation right or other constitutional protection 
regarding nontestimonial statements.37 
Consequently, and finally, Ohio v. Roberts is never 
expressly overruled in Crawford, although its indicia of 
reliability framework no longer governs testimonial 
statements.  Presumably, since Roberts has not been overruled, 
indicia of reliability is still the benchmark for nontestimonial 
hearsay statements, at least until the Court decides 
otherwise.38 
THE CONCURRING OPINION 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O’Connor, 
concurred in the result reached by the Crawford majority.  The 
Chief Justice viewed the majority’s exclusion for a yet-to-be-
defined category of testimonial statements as unnecessarily 
  
question of whether the forfeiture will result in admission of the rankest sort of 
hearsay as well as multiple levels of it, see, e.g., United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 
1283; United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. White, 
838 F. Supp 618, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1993), aff’d, 116 F.3d 903, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1997).  
Finally, even if federal confrontation forfeiture principles encompass the least 
demanding of the above and other relevant forfeiture principles, there remains for 
resolution the more demanding forfeiture hearsay requirements, if any, peculiar to 
each state and the federal jurisdiction. 
 36 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68; see also id. at 53 (“[E]ven if the Sixth 
Amendment is not solely concerned with testimonial hearsay, that is its primary 
object . . . .”). 
 37 Id. at 68.  In White v. Illinois, the Court rejected an argument to limit 
Roberts and apply the Confrontation Clause only to testimonial statements, 502 U.S. 
346, 352-53 (1992), thereby leaving remaining hearsay statements to regulation by 
federal and state evidentiary principles.  Instead, the Court held that the scope of the 
confrontation protection encompassed both kinds of statements if they failed to meet 
the Roberts requirements.  See id. at 353-54.  The Crawford majority notes that its 
analysis casts doubt upon the White holding, but otherwise leaves the issue be.  541 
U.S. at 61. 
 38 See, e.g., United States v. Holmes, 406 F.3d 337, 348 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. 
denied 126 S. Ct. 375 (2005); United States v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 179 n.7 (3d Cir. 
2005); United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 227 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied 125 S. Ct. 
938 (2005). 
12 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1 
bringing major uncertainty to the everyday prosecution of 
criminal cases.39  To the Chief Justice, the well-established 
Roberts indicia of reliability framework was well up to the task 
of resolving the confrontation-hearsay issue presented in 
Crawford, and presumably those arising in the future as well.  
Applying Roberts and its progeny to the custodial statements of 
Crawford’s wife to the police – the crux of the Crawford case – 
the concurring Justices had no difficulty in determining that 
her statements failed to possess adequate indicia of reliability, 
thus reaching the same result as the majority.40 
Turning to the same English and American sources 
relied upon by the majority, the Chief Justice, in his concurring 
opinion, concluded that the Scalian distinction between 
testimonial and nontestimonial statements “is no better rooted 
in history than our current [Roberts] doctrine.”41 Indeed, the 
Chief Justice thought it an “odd conclusion . . . to think that the 
Framers created a cut-and-dried rule with respect to the 
admissibility [of this newly-minted category of] testimonial 
statements when the law during their own time was not fully 
settled.”42  Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist remained 
unconvinced “that the Confrontation Clause categorically 
requires the exclusion of testimonial statements.”43 
THE REACTION 
Immediately, Crawford was editorially celebrated as 
“present[ing] an attractive vision of a Sixth Amendment that 
rigorously lives up to the rights it promises.”44  Crawford’s lead 
  
 39 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 75-76 (“The Court grandly declares that ‘[w]e leave 
for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of “testimonial”’ . . . .  
But the thousands of federal prosecutors and the tens of thousands of state prosecutors 
need answers as to what beyond the specific kinds of ‘testimony’ the Court lists . . . is 
covered by the new rule.  They need them now, not months or years from now.  Rules of 
criminal evidence are applied every day in courts throughout the country, and parties 
should not be left in the dark in this manner.” (citations omitted)).  Justice Scalia 
acknowledges the Chief Justice’s objection, characterizing it as a concern “that the 
[majority’s] refusal to articulate a comprehensive definition [of testimonial] will cause 
interim uncertainty.”  Id. at 68 n.10.  Justice Scalia continues: “But it can hardly be 
any worse than the status quo [Roberts].  The difference is that the Roberts test is 
inherently, and therefore permanently, unpredictable.”  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 40 Id. at 76. 
 41 Id. at 69. 
 42 Id. at 73. 
 43 Id. at 72. 
 44 Editorial, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2004, at A30. Although welcoming 
Crawford, the editorial cautions that the Court “will have to take care to ensure that 
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attorney in the Supreme Court stated that the “decision will 
fundamentally alter the way that criminal defendants are 
tried . . . .  No more will government be able to convict people of 
crimes on the basis of accusations that they are unable to cross-
examine.”45  The second seat attorney in the Supreme Court in 
Crawford, a leading confrontation scholar, wrote that Crawford 
“radically transformed”46 confrontation doctrine; to the news 
media he called it a “wonderful development . . . the court is 
saying . . . that the confrontation clause means what it says.”47  
Another law professor predicted “the question of what 
constitutes testimonial statements would plague lower courts 
and the attorneys in them on a case by case basis for years to 
come.”48 
One New York criminal defense attorney called the 
consequences of Crawford “awesome, [although] how it took so 
long to get a decision like this is beyond belief.”49  A Bronx 
public defender observed:  “Mercifully the U.S. Supreme 
Court . . . just made life in the domestic violence courts a lot 
more pleasant for both defendants and public defenders.”50 
In contrast, a New York prosecutor mourned that 
Crawford “‘may be the most significant criminal law decision 
from the Supreme Court in years . . . .  [The Court has] thrown 
out 30 years of analysis.’”51  A second prosecutor observed that 
in light of Crawford, “‘some prosecutors are slashing their 
wrists because of the concern that statements are now going to 
  
these rules do not become a straitjacket for the federal courts in terrorism trials that 
already present a profound challenge.”  Id. 
 45 Charles Lane, Justices Rule Against Statements Made Out of Court, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 9, 2004, at A8 (quoting Jeffrey L. Fisher). 
 46 Richard D. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford: High Court Decision Restores 
Confrontation Clause Protection, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2004, at 4, 5.  In a side bar to 
this article, a member of the Criminal Justice editorial board calls Crawford a “‘one-
eighty’ . . . a tornado cutting a swath of uncertainty in the criminal justice community.”  
Id. at 5. 
 47 Linda Greenhouse, Court Alters Rule on Statements of Unavailable 
Witnesses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2004, at A21 (quoting Richard Friedman). 
 48 David Ziemer, U.S. Supreme Court Term Left Many Unanswered 
Questions, DAILY RECORD, Oct. 18, 2004 (quoting the remarks of Charles Whitebread at 
the Annual Public Defenders Conference in Milwaukee). 
 49 Tom Perrotta, The Struggle to Define ‘Testimony’ After ‘Crawford’, N.Y.L.J., 
June 21, 2004, at 1 (quoting Mark R. Baker). 
 50 David Feige, Domestic Silence: The Supreme Court Kills Evidence-Based 
Prosecutions, SLATE, Mar. 12, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2097041 (“So from now on, 
when the complainant in a domestic violence case insists she’s not coming to court and 
just wants to drop the charges, I’ll just smile as the judge . . .  says ‘case dismissed.’”). 
 51 Id. (quoting Assistant District Attorney Anthony Girese, Counsel to the 
Bronx District Attorney). 
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be excluded when in fact they . . . are now admissible under 
statutes without any impediments imposed by the Sixth 
Amendment.’”52  A third, somewhat more sanguine, federal 
prosecutor described Crawford as a “‘major restructuring of the 
way the Confrontation Clause is interpreted . . . [a]nd . . . a 
minor win for defendants.’”53 
Almost overnight, Crawford spawned an entire cottage 
industry, including several hundred reported cases, well over 
100 articles, an on-line blog, an on-line outline, an untold 
number of casebooks and text supplements, conferences, CLE 
lectures and presentations at prosecutorial and criminal 
defense training sessions. 
THE CONFERENCE AND THIS SYMPOSIUM 
“Crawford and Beyond,” the first major academic 
conference to address Crawford, sought to explore the thirty-
one page discursive, sprawling and heavily footnoted, dicta-
laden Crawford majority opinion, which raises substantially 
more questions than it answers.54  The program was divided 
  
 52 Leonard Post, Prosecutors Feel Broad Wake of ‘Crawford’; Child Abuse 
Cases, 911 Calls Affected, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 13, 2004, at 1 (quoting Richard Wintory, 
Deputy County Attorney, Pima, Arizona and Vice-President for Deputy Prosecutors of 
The National District Attorney’s Association). 
 53 See Perrotta, supra note 49, at 1 (quoting Daniel R. Alonso, Chief of the 
Criminal Division, United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New 
York). 
 54 Some thirty-eight years before Crawford, an equally discursive, sprawling, 
heavily footnoted, dicta-laden Supreme Court opinion, raising as many, if not more 
questions than it answered, also dealing with everyday issues in criminal prosecutions, 
demanded the attention of academics as well as police prosecutors, defense counsel and 
trial and appellate judges.  See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1996).  Miranda and 
the Fifth Amendment and Crawford and the Sixth Amendment have much more in 
common than a similar opinion style.  To mention but a few, they share a common law 
history involving governmental ex parte examinations by interrogators of the same ilk.  
The minority view in each case concluded that the majority misconstrued and rewrote 
history.  See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 526 (White, J., dissenting; joined by Harlan & 
Stewart, J.J.); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69 (Rehnquist, J., concurring; joined by O’Connor, 
J.).  The text of each amendment contains the word “witness,” which, in large part, 
determines the scope of protection afforded by each.  U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. 
CONST. amend. VI.  Both Miranda and Crawford rejected a twenty-five or more year-
old standard as too malleable, and as having had the unpardonable vice of leading 
lower courts to admit the very evidence sought to be excluded by the respective 
amendments.  The minority view in each case viewed the existing framework as more 
than adequate to address the admissibility of the statements at issue.  See Miranda, 
384 U.S. at 508 (Harlan, J., dissenting; joined by Stewart & White, J.J.); Crawford, 541 
U.S. at 71 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).  Each case involves police interrogation and the 
statements derived from it. 
  To Justice Scalia, Miranda is the antithesis of sound constitutional 
decision-making, in large part because it leads to exclusion of statements that have not 
been compelled, and thus do not violate the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-
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into four sessions.  This Symposium issue of the Brooklyn Law 
Review is devoted to the papers presented at three of those 
sessions – history, testimonial statements, and statements in 
domestic violence and child abuse prosecutions – and essays by 
a number of the commentators at each session.55 
Historical Background 
In the article that opens this symposium, “Does 
Crawford Provide a Stable Foundation for Confrontation 
Doctrine?,” University of Nebraska Professor Roger Kirst 
begins with a thorough review of the evolution of confrontation 
doctrine in Supreme Court decisions.56  He next examines the 
opinions in Crawford, with special focus on historical sources, 
especially the constitutional debates at state ratifying 
conventions.57  Importantly, with respect to the ratification 
history, he explains why that record demonstrates that no 
specific rules of confrontation were intended by the drafters.58  
Rather, he concludes that history indicates an intent to leave 
confrontation procedure to judicial development.59  Professor 
Kirst also offers support for his view that the Confrontation 
Clause is not an incorporation of, or even an implicit reference 
to, the English evidentiary common law of hearsay.60 
Based on his analysis, Professor Kirst concludes that 
Justice Scalia was certainly correct that the Confrontation 
Clause was designed to provide criminal defendants with a 
right to cross-examine some hearsay declarants in order to 
provide the trier of fact with an adequate basis to evaluate the 
  
incrimination.  See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 447-50 (2000) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).  It remains to be seen whether subsequent Supreme Court decisions 
defining testimonial statements will continue to be limited to those derived from 
modern day practices most closely akin to the civil law mode of ex parte examination 
procedures at which the Confrontation Clause is directed. 
 55 The fourth session centered around a robust discussion of an extensive 
hypothetical, raising many of the open issues.  Included in the hypothetical was a 
simulated, life-like recording of a telephone call to 911.  Editing the transcript of the 
panel discussion raised insurmountable problems.  Consequently, it was decided not to 
publish the hypothetical or the discussion. The simulated 911 call and a transcript of it 
can be found at www.brooklaw.edu/news/homepage_news/crawford2005.php#video 
(follow “Part IV: Real Hypotheticals” hyperlink). 
 56 Roger W. Kirst, Does Crawford Provide a Stable Foundation for 
Confrontation Doctrine?, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 40-64 (2005). 
 57 See id. at 64-71, 77-83. 
 58 See id. at 77-83. 
 59 See id. at 82-83. 
 60 See id. at 83-84. 
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truth and accuracy of the out-of-court statement.61  On the 
other hand, Professor Kirst doubts that the purpose of the 
Confrontation Clause was to exclude certain kinds of hearsay,62 
and he argues that it was surely not designed to draw a 
distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial 
statements.63 
Professor Kirst then gives reasons and lays a foundation 
for fine-tuning the testimonial framework.64  Specifically, when 
the Court addresses with more particularity the distinction 
between testimonial and nontestimonial statements, Professor 
Kirst recommends that the concept of testimonial should focus 
on whether admitting the particular hearsay statement, absent 
cross-examination of the declarant, is consistent with the 
purposes of confrontation – that is, to provide the defendant 
with an ability to contest the statement, and thereby to provide 
the fact-finder with a sufficient basis for evaluating the 
accuracy and truthfulness of the statement.65 
At the February 2005 “Crawford and Beyond” 
Conference, University of Tennessee Law School Professor Tom 
Davies provided only the introduction to his prospective article.  
That introduction promised a thorough exploration of English 
common law, of the early American experience, and of the 
difficulty of evaluating today’s world of evidentiary hearsay 
and constitutional confrontation principles by exclusive 
reference to and guidance by 400 years of history and doctrine.   
That promise is more than fulfilled in his lead article, 
“What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know It?  
Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington.”66  Professor 
Davies argues persuasively that the testimonial/nontestimonial 
dichotomy drawn in Crawford was neither part of the original 
meaning of the Confrontation Clause, nor the English common 
law, nor even pre-ratification American law.67 
Moreover, as analyzed by Professor Davies, the English 
common law cases and authorities relied upon by Justice Scalia 
to support a common law right of confrontation and cross-
  
 61 See id. at 99-100. 
 62 See id. 
 63 See id. at 86-87. 
 64 See id. at 88-91. 
 65 See id. at 99-100. 
 66 Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know 
It?  Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105 (2005). 
 67 See id. at 107, 119. 
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examination simply fail to do so.  Indeed, given the publication 
date of at least three of those cases, Professor Davies argues 
that they were irrelevant to the original American 
understanding of the Confrontation Clause.68  He also explains 
why the authorities relied on by the Crawford majority fail to 
establish that a rigid rule of cross-examination regarding 
hearsay statements was part of the American understanding of 
the common law confrontation right before or during 
ratification of the Bill of Rights.69  In this regard, Professor 
Davies’ use of Justice of the Peace manuals and treatises 
available in the colonies is particularly illuminating.70 
More fundamentally, Professor Davies explains why he 
thinks that judicial-chambers historical research is an 
inherently flawed process that usually leads to inaccurate 
history.71  He points out that it is only natural to examine 
history to support a conclusion already reached, instead of 
examining history and then, if possible, reaching a conclusion 
of how the modern doctrine can most accurately reflect the 
past.72  Perhaps more importantly, even if one could correctly 
divine history, Professor Davies argues that framing-era 
doctrine is usually so far removed in time, place and context 
from the modern era that it cannot be applied to legal concepts 
as they are presently understood, or for that matter to 
contemporary practices.73  As a result, reasoning relying only 
  
 68 See id. at 116-18. 
 69 See id. at 118-19. 
 70 See id. at 118. 
 71 See id. at 119-20.  But cf. Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (Or To 
It), 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1587, 1588 (1997) (“Skepticism about the limits of judicial 
reasoning does not require a blanket dismissal of the possibility that historically 
grounded approaches to originalism might indeed yield fruitful results.”).   
 72 See Davies, supra note 66, at 120 n.43.  But see ANTONIN SCALIA, A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 45-46 (Princeton Univ. 
Press 1997) (“[T]he difficulties and uncertainties of determining original meaning and 
applying it to modern circumstances are negligible compared with the difficulties and 
uncertainties of the philosophy which says that the Constitution changes . . . .  The 
originalist, if he does not have all the answers, has many of them.  The Confrontation 
Clause for example, requires confrontation.”) (emphasis in original). 
 73 Davies, supra note 66, at 119-20.  But see JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL 
MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 6-7 (A. A. Knopf 
1996) (“[W]hat is most remarkable about our knowledge of the adoption of the 
Constitution is not how little we understand but how much . . . . However 
indeterminate some of our findings may be, however much more evidence we could 
always use, the origins of the Constitution are not ‘buried in silence or veiled in fable.’”  
There are many sources that document the daily deliberations at the Constitutional 
Convention as well as the subsequent ratification debates, all of which reveal the 
meanings first attached to the Constitution.  Additionally, the “larger intellectual 
world” within which the Constitution is often located is not completely foreign to most 
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upon framing-era doctrine and history cannot provide a 
definitive answer to a contemporary question.74 
In his essay, “The Too-Easy Historical Assumptions of 
Crawford v. Washington,” New York Law School Professor 
Randolph Jonakait explores what he sees as a fatal flaw in 
Crawford’s conclusion that the Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Clause constitutionalized English common law.75  
To demonstrate the point, Professor Jonakait highlights other 
clauses of that very same Amendment, namely the rights of 
defendant to the assistance of counsel, to notice of the charges, 
and to compulsory process, that were undoubtedly in 
derogation of the English common law.76  Given that these 
other Sixth Amendment rights do not constitutionalize the 
common law, to Professor Jonakait it is incongruous to 
conclude, especially without any support in the text or in the 
record of ratification, that the Framers sought to codify an 
English common law of confrontation.  Indeed, Professor 
Jonakait, as has Professor Kirst,77 points to the text of the 
Seventh Amendment to illustrate that when the drafters 
sought to continue adherence to the common law, they did so 
expressly.78 
To be sure, as Professor Jonakait acknowledges, the 
Sixth Amendment jury trial provision is adopted from English 
law.79  Still, and with considerable force, Professor Jonakait 
argues that the methods for conducting those trials were not 
derived from the English common law, but instead were 
essentially American in character.80  Additionally, Professor 
  
scholars.); Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: A Comment 
on Professor Lessig’s Theory of Translation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 1447 (1997) 
(“Our Constitution is written in English and was ratified by people who read Aristotle 
and Plato; Shakespeare and Milton; Aquinas and Augustine; Hobbes and Hume; Locke 
and Monstequieu; Voltaire and Rousseau; Jefferson and Madison; the Old and New 
Testaments of the Bible; Dante and Homer.  Americans think the 200 years from the 
Republic of Slavery to the Democracy of today is an eon . . . .  The American legal 
tradition is just not that old nor can the Constitution be fairly compared to some 
ancient manuscript written in Greek or Sanskrit.”). 
 74 Davies, supra note 66, at 121-22. 
 75 Randolph N. Jonakait, The Too-Easy Historical Assumptions of Crawford 
v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 219 (2005). 
 76 See id. at 220-24. 
 77 Kirst, supra note 56, at 84. 
 78 Jonakait, supra note 75, at 231. 
 79 See id. at 225-26. 
 80 See id. at 226; see also 30 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, at 347 (“The 
American history [of confrontation] is not a continuation of the story in England but a 
separate story that has significant overlap and interconnection with events in 
England.”). 
2005] CRAWFORD AND BEYOND: INTRODUCTION 19 
Jonakait argues that by assuming a common law basis for the 
confrontation right, the reasoning of Crawford serves only to 
cast doubt on other longstanding Sixth Amendment principles 
– for example, an indigent criminal defendant’s right to 
assigned counsel.81 
Finally, with respect to history, Cardozo Law School 
Professor Peter Tillers provides a brief, amusing, thoughtful 
essay, “Legal History for a Dummy: A Comment on the Role of 
History in Judicial Interpretation of the Confrontation 
Clause.”82  A self-confessed non-historian, Professor Tillers 
finds both Professors Kirst and Davies persuasive regarding 
the inaccurate history in Crawford that they argue 
misinformed the Crawford decision.83  He concludes that the 
historical mistakes and distortions in Crawford occurred 
because the Court knows neither how to conduct an effective 
historical inquiry, nor how to use the facts disclosed by such an 
inquiry.84  Still, he warns that Crawford’s mistakes about legal 
history do not necessarily mean that Crawford is an 
unwelcome decision.  That, he says, depends on how the text of 
Crawford is read and its implications are interpreted.85 
When addressing the meaning of testimonial 
statements,86 Mark Dwyer, who has been the Chief of Appeals 
in the New York County District Attorney’s Office for the past 
twenty years, cautions that despite the fascinating nature of 
the debate over history, practicing attorneys must rely on 
controlling precedent.  Mr. Dwyer advises that prosecutors and 
defense counsel cannot simply walk into the courtroom and tell 
the judge, “Sure there is Crawford v. Washington, but Justice 
Scalia got the history wrong, and so here is how you should let 
me try my case.”87  Mr. Dwyer observes that when the Court 
decides a major case like Crawford, “everything past is 
essentially irrelevant” and analysis has to start with 
  
 81 Jonakait, supra note 75, at 232-34. 
 82 Peter Tillers, Legal History for a Dummy: A Comment on the Role of 
History in Judicial Interpretation of the Confrontation Clause, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 235 
(2005). 
 83 See id. at 237. 
 84 See id. at 238. 
 85 See id. at 237 n.12. 
 86 See Mark Dwyer, Crawford’s “Testimonial Hearsay” Category: A Plain 
Limit on the Protections of the Confrontation Clause, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 275 (2005), 
discussed more fully at text accompanying note 108, infra. 
 87 Id. at 275. 
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Crawford.88  Nonetheless, history should continue to play a role 
in determining the kinds of statements that are at the 
testimonial core of Crawford and its view of confrontation. 
The Meaning of Testimonial 
University of Michigan Law Professor Richard 
Friedman explores the category of testimonial statements in 
his lead article, “Grappling with the Meaning of 
‘Testimonial.’”89  After a careful and thoughtful analysis, he 
favors an objective approach, focusing on whether a reasonable 
declarant would have understood at the time he or she made 
the statement that there was a significant probability that the 
statement would be used by the prosecution.90  In his view, 
whether a statement is testimonial depends on whether it 
performs the function of testimony, not whether the statement 
fits within a predetermined list of characteristics.91  
Consequently, the formal nature of the statement, the 
participation of a governmental agent or government abuse in 
securing it, the presence of interrogation, and the presence of 
excitement surrounding the statement are not essential to 
finding a statement testimonial.92  Rather, by way of emphasis, 
not repetition, the controlling issue is whether the hearsay 
statement performs the function of testimony.   
It could well be argued that any out-of-court statement 
offered to prove the truth of a fact asserted in that statement 
always performs the function of testimony.  But to Professor 
Friedman, an out-of-court declarant is a witness who “bears 
testimony,” within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause, 
when he or she makes a statement reasonably believing that it 
will be used in a criminal proceeding.93  In his analysis, 
Professor Friedman attempts to demonstrate the practical 
implications of this approach. 
Finally, Professor Friedman notes briefly how the 
objective testimonial approach would address statements of 
children.  He “tend[s] to believe” that, because of their 
  
 88 Id. 
 89 Richard D. Friedman, Grappling With the Meaning of “Testimonial,” 71 
BROOK. L. REV. 241 (2005). 
 90 See id. at 252-54. 
 91 See id. at 249. 
 92 See id. at 243. 
 93 Id. at 267 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)). 
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undeveloped understanding, very young children who make 
out-of-court statements should not be treated as witnesses 
within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause.94  Assuming a 
child is capable of being a “witness,” the question then becomes 
whether his or her hearsay statement should be considered 
testimonial.  Since Professor Friedman favors an objective 
standard for determining whether a declarant reasonably 
believed that a statement would be used prosecutorially, he 
concludes that a child’s age and immaturity would be 
irrelevant.95  Yet, Professor Friedman acknowledges 
“something a little odd about asking, with respect to a 
statement by a young child, what the anticipation of a 
reasonable adult would be.”96 
In his essay “Testimonial Statements under Crawford: 
What Makes Testimony . . . Testimonial,”97 Brooks Holland, a 
criminal defense attorney with eleven years of practice 
experience in New York City and presently a Visiting Professor 
of Law at Gonzaga University Law School, finds a testimonial 
out-of-court statement to be one in which the surrounding 
circumstances made its adjudicative use foreseeable to the 
declarant.98  To Professor Holland, objective expectation is the 
key to the meaning of testimonial, not artificial notions of 
  
 94 Id. at 272.  Presumably, since very young children are not “witnesses,” 
their statements are not testimonial, and thus not within the categorical ban of 
Crawford.  See Richard D. Friedman, The Conundrum of Children, Confrontation, and 
Hearsay, 65 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 243, 250 (2002). 
 95 Friedman, supra note 89, at 272-73.  If a subjective test is used, Professor 
Friedman views the proper focus to be whether “the child understood that she [or he] 
was reporting wrongdoing and that some adverse consequences – including that 
Mommy [presumably Daddy too] would get mad – would be visited on the wrongdoer.”  
Id. at 273. 
 96 Id. at 273.  Compare Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 667-68 (2004) 
(Kennedy, J.; joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, J., and Thomas, J.) (indicating that the 
objective reasonable person standard to determine whether a suspect is in custody for 
purposes of Miranda is designed to give clear guidance to the police, and that clarity 
could be diminished if consideration of the suspect’s individual characteristics – 
including his age – are required), with id. at 669 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]here 
may be cases in which a suspect’s age will be relevant to the ‘custody’ inquiry under 
Miranda . . . however, [in this case] Alvarado was almost 18 at the time of this 
interview.”), and id. at 673-75 (age is an objective, widely shared characteristic that 
does not complicate, but is relevant to, the custody inquiry; the “‘reasonable person’ 
standard does not require a court to pretend that Alvarado was a 35-year-old with 
aging parents whose middle-aged children do what their parent ask only out of 
respect”).  Cf. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Camplin, 2 All Eng. Rep. 168, 2 W.L.R. 678, 
685 (House of Lords 1978) (provocation defense inter alia focuses on the degree of self 
control to be expected of a reasonable person of the same age as defendant).   
 97 Brooks Holland, Testimonial Statements under Crawford: What Makes 
Testimony . . . Testimonial?, 71 BROOK L. REV. 281 (2005). 
 98 See id. at 287-88. 
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formality, statement context, witness cognition, interrogation 
structure, status of the questioner, or governmental abuse.99 
In his essay, “Purpose as a Guide to the Interpretation 
of the Confrontation Clause,”100 University of California-
Hastings Professor Roger Park agrees with most of the 
substance in Professor Friedman’s article.  Nonetheless, he 
finds it problematic, if not overly simplistic, to describe the 
purpose of the confrontation guarantee as providing a criminal 
defendant with the opportunity to cross-examine testimonial 
hearsay defendants who must testify in the defendant’s 
presence.101 
Professor Park believes it necessary to delve deeper into 
why the Framers thought a right of confrontation to be 
constitutionally necessary.  Citing a 1992 article by the 
moderator of the program’s testimonial session,102 Professor 
Park views the “primary purpose of the Confrontation Clause is 
to prevent injustice caused by abuse of state power.”103  He then 
proceeds to explain his view of how the inability to confront 
nontestifying hearsay declarants facilitates abuse of power by 
the government. 
Professor Park also views the Crawford opinion as open 
to, if not embracive of, a functional approach, focusing on 
whether a statement was secured by governmental 
overreaching to define the scope of the confrontation right, 
especially the meaning of testimonial.104  Professor Park gives 
the example of a child abuse case where he would focus on 
whether a child hearsay declarant was subject to a suggestive 
governmental interview, rather than focusing on the daunting, 
sometimes impossible task of determining whether the child 
was old enough to know that his or her statement might be 
used in a criminal prosecution.  Professor Park also suggests 
that the government-abuse approach could provide a principled 
  
 99 See generally Holland, supra note 97. 
 100 Roger C. Park, Purpose as a Guide to the Interpretation of the 
Confrontation Clause, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 297 (2005). 
 101 See id. at 297-98. 
 102 Berger, Prosecutorial Restraint, supra note 11, at 557, 558-61. 
 103 Park, supra note 100, at 298. 
 104 See id. at 301-02; see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. at 56 n.7 
(“Involvement of government officers in the production of testimony with an eye toward 
trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse – a fact borne out time and 
again throughout a history with which the Framers were keenly familiar.”). 
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basis by which to conclude that casual hearsay to a private 
individual passes constitutional-confrontation muster.105 
Professor Park emphasizes that particular results are 
not the focus of his concern.106  Nevertheless, simply because 
the Roberts indicia of reliability framework proved 
unsatisfactory to Professor Park, it does not follow that the 
same fate awaits a confrontation inquiry focusing on 
governmental abuse or overreaching.107 
Playing the game by the rules enunciated in Crawford, 
the aforementioned Mark Dwyer108 reads testimonial to include 
only those modern day statements that truly resemble the class 
of formal statements disfavored at common law.  Those 
statements include affidavits, depositions and statements of 
witnesses and accomplices taken by magistrates, justices of the 
peace, and other officers of the crown.109 
According to Mr. Dwyer, broadening the testimonial 
category to include hearsay statements not of this ilk is simply 
not within the holding of Crawford.110  He is also critical of the 
attempt to redefine testimonial to include statements of a 
declarant who believes that such statements will have a law 
enforcement “use,” because belief about “use” is simply not 
enough to make an out-of-court declarant a witness bearing 
testimony.111  Rather, he says, the focus of testimonial should 
be a declarant’s expectation that his or her statement will serve 
as the equivalent of in-court testimony.112 
Finally, Mr. Dwyer emphasizes that nontestimonial 
statements may be inadmissible hearsay, but that does not, per 
se, render such statements excludible under the Confrontation 
Clause.113  Indeed, to Mr. Dwyer, arguments seeking to broaden 
the scope of testimonial well beyond the statements obtained 
under the civil law ex parte mode of examination are nothing 
more than a desire to recast the Confrontation Clause into a 
super rule against hearsay.  Mr. Dwyer expresses profound 
skepticism that Crawford supports such a result.114 
  
 105 Park, supra note 100, at 298-99. 
 106 See id. at 303. 
 107 See id. at 305. 
 108 See Dwyer, supra note 86. 
 109 See id. at 277. 
 110 See id. at 277-78. 
 111 Id. at 279. 
 112 See id. 
 113 See id. at 278. 
 114 See id. 
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In his essay, Paul Shechtman, a leading New York 
criminal defense attorney and former New York County and 
federal prosecutor, who teaches evidence at Columbia 
University Law School, bemoans the demise of the Roberts 
indicia of reliability framework.115  He does so because he 
believes that Roberts asked the correct question:  “was the out-
of-court statement sufficiently reliable that it could be 
admitted at criminal trial untested by cross-examination?”116  
Mr. Shechtman observes that the new Crawford standard 
fosters unpredictability117 and he expresses concern that 
Crawford will weaken Confrontation Clause protections for 
defendants by permitting the introduction of testimony of 
dubious reliability.118 
Mr. Shechtman also describes an untoward consequence 
of Crawford involving the possible unconstitutionality of 
Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 803(6).119  That rule, in part, 
authorizes a business record custodian, in lieu of testifying, to 
submit an affidavit certifying that a record complies with Rule 
902(11), Rule 902(12) or other statutes permitting certification.  
Given that an affidavit of certification is made for the very 
purpose of being introduced in evidence, it is, the argument 
goes, testimonial and hence inadmissible in a criminal case, 
absent the affiant’s testimony.120  Yet, this kind of affidavit 
hardly resembles the civil-law ex parte deposition at which the 
right of confrontation is directed.121  Mr. Shechtman’s concern 
in this regard implicitly recognizes that requiring the certifying 
affiant to testify defeats the very practical purpose of the 
certification process, which is to permit record custodians to 
  
 115 Paul L. Shechtman, From “Reliability” to Uncertainty: Difficulties Inherent 
in Interpreting and Applying the New Crawford Standard, 71 BROOK L. REV. 305, 307 
(2005). 
 116 Id. at 306. 
 117 See id. at 308. 
 118 See id. at 309. 
 119 Mr. Shechtman points to a pre-Crawford federal district court case decided 
under the indicia of reliability framework that had upheld against a confrontation 
challenge the admissibility of a certification of foreign business records pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3505.  See Shechtman, supra note 115, at 308-09 (citing United States v. 
Chan, 680 F. Supp. 521, 522 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (Weinstein, J.)). 
 120 See United States v. Wittig, No. 03-40142JAR, 2005 WL 1227790 (D. Kan. 
May 23, 2005) (Federal Rule of Evidence certification of business record excluded as 
testimonial). 
 121 See State v. Cook, No. WD-04-029, 2005 WL 736671, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Mar. 31, 2005) (affidavit by custodian of documents that they are made and kept in the 
ordinary course of business is not the kind of testimonial evidence about which 
Crawford is concerned). 
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perform the job for which they have been employed, rather 
than having to become professional witnesses.122 
Testimonial Statements in Domestic Violence and Child Abuse 
Prosecutions 
Throughout her article, “Remember the Ladies and the 
Children Too: Crawford’s Impact on Domestic Violence and 
Sexual Abuse Cases,”123 Southwestern Law School Professor 
Myrna Raeder is intellectually forthright in presenting her 
viewpoint and the conflicting concerns and policies that have 
engendered it.  On the one side is her belief in the need and 
desirability to assure that the voices of women and children are 
heard, both to protect them and to lower the incidence of 
domestic violence and sexual abuse.124  On the other side is her 
fear of eviscerating defendants’ rights to confront live witnesses 
with first-hand knowledge, as opposed to second-hand 
reporters of hearsay, and her corresponding view that the 
category “testimonial hearsay” should be interpreted broadly.125 
Professor Raeder seems both amazed and dismayed that 
the right of confrontation in 2004 is to be defined by focusing 
on the world of 1791, a “world that typically treated [women 
and children] as chattel” and in which domestic violence and 
sexual abuse prosecutions were virtually unknown.126  A world, 
as Professor Raeder describes it, without organized police 
departments, medical or forensic protocols in criminal cases, 
mandatory reporting requirements for medical personnel who 
have knowledge of domestic violence or child abuse, videotape, 
audiotape, closed-circuit television, telephones, computers, e-
mail, typewriters, emergency 911 operators, mandatory arrest 
and no-drop prosecution policies in domestic violence or child 
sex abuse cases, protective orders, and expansive hearsay 
exceptions.127 
With the 2004/1791 dichotomy as a backdrop, Professor 
Raeder examines domestic violence and its criminalization, as 
  
 122 See Napier v. State, 827 N.E.2d 565, 569 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) 
(“unreasonable to have a toxicologist in every court on a daily basis offering testimony 
about his [or her] inspection of a breathalyzer machine and the certification of the 
operator as a proper administrator of the breath test”) (citation omitted). 
 123 Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too: Crawford’s 
Impact on Domestic Violence and Sexual Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 311 (2005). 
 124 See id. at 314. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 See id. at 311-12, 324. 
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well as the realities of domestic violence prosecutions.128  She 
also discusses current trends affecting domestic violence and 
child abuse litigation. 
She critiques the testimonial approach of Crawford and 
presents her view on the appropriate definition of testimonial 
statements, in particular excited utterances, “the workhorse of 
domestic violence cases.”129  She considers other hearsay 
exceptions frequently used in such prosecutions, i.e. statements 
for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment, dying 
declarations, prior inconsistent statements of testifying 
victims, ad hoc exceptions, as well as forfeiture.130  Professor 
Raeder then discusses some of these issues as they arise in 
child abuse prosecutions.131 
She also explores waiver by a defendant “opening the 
door”132 to testimonial statements, the expansion of admissible 
hearsay for declarants who testify, and embraces “evidentiary 
creativity”133 with respect to new post-Crawford hearsay 
exceptions in domestic violence cases, and expert testimony to 
provide needed background information about domestic battery 
and child abuse.134 
Finally, and “more globally,” Professor Raeder proposes 
restructuring domestic violence prosecutions into three distinct 
tracks in order to allocate the scarce judicial resources to the 
prosecution of the most dangerous offenders.135 
In his essay, “Crawford’s Impact on Hearsay 
Statements in Domestic Violence and Child Sexual Abuse 
Cases,”136 Duke University Law Professor Robert Mosteller 
acknowledges that, regardless of the ultimate definitional 
breadth of “testimonial,” Crawford will substantially limit the 
admissibility of hearsay in domestic violence cases and have a 
somewhat lesser, but nonetheless significant, impact on the 
admissibility of hearsay in child abuse cases.137  The breadth of 
testimonial notwithstanding, Professor Mosteller explores 
  
 128 See id. at 326-32. 
 129 Raeder supra note 123, at 332. 
 130 See id. at 348-66. 
 131 See id. at 374-89. 
 132 Id. at 359. 
 133 Id. at 315. 
 134 See id. at 366-67, 370-371.  
 135 Id. at 315, 367. 
 136 Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford’s Impact on Hearsay Statements in Domestic 
Violence and Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 411 (2005). 
 137 Id. at 411-12. 
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available tools, or tools that could be made available, that will 
assist the successful prosecution of domestic violence and child 
abuse cases.138 
He also suggests that in child sexual abuse cases better, 
harder, and more creative work by prosecutors in preparing a 
child witness to testify will well-serve successful 
prosecutions.139  Given that the Crawford majority leaves no 
doubt that if the declarant testifies, then there is no 
confrontation bar to the introduction of his or her prior hearsay 
statements,140 Professor Mosteller points approvingly to an 
Oregon statute that provides for the admissibility of all prior 
statements by a child sexual abuse victim in a sex crime 
prosecution, provided the child testifies and is subject to cross-
examination.141  Of course, absent such a statute, he recognizes 
that the traditional rule against hearsay will prove 
troublesome for the introduction of many of the statements 
that would be admissible only under an Oregon-type 
provision.142 
Professor Mosteller advocates that domestic violence 
victims testify at an early adversary proceeding hearing such 
as a preliminary hearing, a conditional examination to 
preserve testimony, or other deposition, provided that the 
defendant has an opportunity and real motive to cross-examine 
the victim, as well as other restrictions.143  Additionally, he also 
provides sound reasoning to support the conclusion that the 
confrontation right is not satisfied simply by producing the 
declarant either at a pretrial hearing or at trial to be called by 
the defendant.144 
Professor Mosteller agrees that if the restrictions he 
suggests are adhered to, then, regardless of whether the victim 
is subsequently unavailable to testify or is called by the 
prosecution to testify, the introduction of the prior hearing 
  
 138 See id. at 412-13. 
 139 Id. at 414-15. 
 140 Id. at 414. 
 141 Id. at 415 (citing OR. R. EVID. 803(18a)(b) (OR. REV. STAT. § 40.460(18a)(b) 
(2005))).  More problematic is another Oregon law, OR. REV. STAT. § 40.460(26a) (2005), 
Rule 803(26a).  That statute provides for the admissibility of any domestic violence 
accusation made within 24 hours of the event and either recorded electronically or in 
writing, or made to a peace officer, other corrections officer, youth corrections officer, 
parole officer, probation officer, emergency medical technician, or firefighter.  See 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 58 n.8 (2004); see also supra note 25. 
 142 Mosteller, supra note 136, at 420-21. 
 143 See id. at 415-16. 
 144 See id. at 416-17. 
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testimony would not violate the confrontation right.  This is so 
even if, as Professor Mosteller postulates, the victim at trial 
exonerates the defendant, refuses to implicate the defendant, 
or denies making or the truth of the prior statement.145 
Finally, Professor Mosteller voices concern that once 
prior confronted testimony of a victim has been secured, the 
prosecution may have less of an incentive to procure the trial 
testimony of the victim.146  He believes, however, that this 
concern can be addressed by judicial vigilance to ensure that 
the witness is indeed unavailable, and that the prosecution 
worked “roughly as hard to find and produce the witness as it 
does in cases where the witness is needed to prove the 
prosecution’s case.”147 
In his essay, “Yes, Virginia, There Is a Confrontation 
Clause,”148 Professor Tom Lininger of the University of Oregon 
School of Law does not share Professor Raeder’s uneasiness 
over a historical testimonial approach to the Confrontation 
Clause.149  Rather, Professor Lininger concludes that the 
“testimonial approach is more faithful to the Framers’ intent 
[and] concerns”150 about confrontation than the vague Roberts 
indicia of reliability framework. 
As for excited utterances that often mark domestic 
violence cases, Professor Lininger agrees with Professor Raeder 
that a categorical approach is too drastic.151  This is true 
regardless of whether excited hearsay utterances are routinely 
treated as testimonial or nontestimonial.152  In particular, with 
respect to automatic nontestimonial status for excited 
utterances, Professor Lininger directs attention to a footnote in 
Crawford, in which the Court strongly implies an inclination to 
include within the police-interrogation testimonial subcategory 
some modern day noncustodial spontaneous (excited) 
utterances of child sex abuse victims.153 
  
 145 See id. at 417-19. 
 146 See id. at 425-26. 
 147 Id. at 426 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 79-80 (1980) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting)). 
 148 Tom Lininger, Yes, Virginia, There Is a Confrontation Clause, 71 BROOK. L. 
REV. 401 (2005). 
 149 Id. at 402. 
 150 Id. 
 151 See id. at 404. 
 152 See id. at 403-04. 
 153 See id. at 404 n.15 (citing 541 U.S. 36, 58 n.8 (2004)); see also supra note 
25. 
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Instead of a per se approach, Professor Lininger 
acknowledges that excited utterances could be subject to a 
case-by-case consideration of factors that serve to distinguish 
testimonial from nontestimonial statements.  He fears, 
however, the unpredictable and easily manipulable nature of 
such an ad hoc approach, which he finds far too reminiscent of 
the Roberts indicia of reliability standard repudiated by 
Crawford.154 
Professor Lininger offers another approach, which 
would treat all statements to police officers as presumptively 
testimonial, provided that the declarant believes that she or he 
was speaking to the police.155  Under Professor Lininger’s view, 
the prosecution could rebut the presumption with a “strong 
  
 154 See Lininger, supra note 148, at 405. 
 155 Id.  Compare, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 552 
(Mass. 2005) (“[S]tatements made in response to questioning by law enforcement 
agents, e.g. concerning physical abuse by boyfriend, are per se testimonial except when 
the questioning is meant to secure a volatile scene or to establish the need for or 
provide medical care.”), and United States v. Arnold, 410 F.3d 895, 901, 903-04 (6th 
Cir. 2005) (Even though a statement of a woman who had been menaced by a man with 
a gun was within the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule it was excluded 
because a ‘“statement made knowingly to the authorities that describes criminal 
activity is almost always testimonial’” and “the decisive inquiry should be ‘whether a 
reasonable person in the declarant’s position would anticipate his [or her] statement 
being used against the accused in investigating or prosecuting the crime,’” (quoting 
United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir. 2004))), and State v. Moody, 594 
S.E.2d 350, 353 n.6 (Ga. 2004) (holding testimonial a murder victim’s statements to 
police officers conducting field investigation shortly after defendant had fired his 
shotgun into her bedroom), with Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 456-58 (Ind. 2005) 
(Excited utterance responses, e.g. of an abused spouse, to initial inquiries at a crime 
scene are typically not testimonial; the standard for testimonial focuses on the 
subjective intent, i.e. motivation, of the declarant and the questioner “more than that of 
the declarant”; and when a statement is taken pursuant to established procedures the 
subjective motivation of the questioner or the objectively-evaluated purpose of the 
procedure controls.  An affidavit signed at the scene by the victim-wife is, however 
testimonial.), cert. granted, No. 05-5705 (U.S. Oct. 31, 2005), available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/103105pzor.pdf at 3.  See also State 
v. Greene, 874 A.2d 750, 775 (Conn. 2005) (“where a [shooting] victim contacts a police 
officer immediately following a criminal incident to report a possible injury and the 
officer receives information or asks questions to ensure that the victim receives proper 
medical attention and the crime scene is properly secured, the victim’s statements 
describing the crime are not testimonial,” but part and parcel of the crime itself.  In 
these situations, “an objective witness reasonably would not believe that the 
statements would be available for use at a later trial.” (citation omitted)).  Statements 
made during 911 emergency calls have been addressed on a case-by-case basis, focusing 
on whether the call is a truly spontaneous, excited plea for help, contemporaneous with 
or immediately after the danger has presented itself, or simply a narrative of past 
events.  See, e.g., Arnold, 410 F.3d at 900-01; United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355, 
361-62 (3d Cir. 2005); State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802, 811 (Minn. 2005); People v. 
Coleman, 791 N.Y.S.2d 112, 114 (App. Div. 2005); State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 
2005), cert. granted, No. 05-5225 (U.S. Oct. 31, 2005), available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/103105pzor.pdf at 3. 
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showing” that the nontestimonial characteristics outweigh the 
testimonial characteristics.156 
Professor Lininger shares Professor Raeder’s belief that 
one of Crawford’s “greatest shortcomings” is its failure to 
address specifically whether confrontation or due process 
requirements limit the admissibility of nontestimonial 
statements of declarants who do not testify.157  A number of 
courts have used the Crawford-savaged Roberts reliability 
framework with respect to nontestimonial statements that are 
not at the core of the Confrontation Clause.158  As an 
alternative, Professor Lininger finds attractive the Oregon 
Supreme Court’s state constitutional approach to the Roberts 
indicia of reliability framework, requiring the prosecution to 
establish the unavailability of the declarant or to produce the 
declarant as a prerequisite to the admissibility of a hearsay 
statement.159  This Oregon approach is virtually identical to 
language in Roberts, which ironically, was also subsequently 
rejected by the pre-Crawford Supreme Court, that time 
because the unavailability approach was overly protective of 
the confrontation right.160 
In conclusion, Professor Lininger advocates, as does 
Professor Mosteller,161 that prosecutors direct their attention to 
  
 156 Lininger, supra note 148, at 405. 
 157 Id. at 405; Raeder, supra note 123, at 316-17. 
 158 Courts use the indicia of reliability framework because that portion of 
Roberts has not yet been set aside with respect to nontestimonial hearsay statements.  
See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.  Given that firmly-rooted hearsay 
exceptions are conclusively deemed reliable under the indicia of reliability framework 
of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 74 (1980), most nontestimonial statements will be 
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not have particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.  Compare, e.g., United States v. 
Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 230-31 (2d Cir. 2004) (nontestimonial, non-custodial declaration 
against penal interest of a co-conspirator to a private party bore particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness), Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 84-85 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(accomplice statements within the “firmly rooted” hearsay exception for state of mind 
declaration are clothed by indicia of reliability), and State v. Manuel, 697 N.W.2d 811, 
814-28 (Wis. 2005) (declarant’s private conversation with his girlfriend describing a 
shooting, as well as the defendant’s participation in it, shortly after the incident took 
place, is not testimonial, even though the statement came within a state hearsay 
exception for statements of recent perception, that exception is not firmly rooted; 
nonetheless, the statement bears sufficient particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness to satisfy the Roberts indicia of reliability requirement), with Miller v. 
State, 98 P.3d 738, 744-48 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004) (accomplice’s confession to a private 
person is nontestimonial but there are no particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness). 
 159 Lininger, supra note 148, at 406; see State v. Moore, 49 P.3d 785, 788-91 
(Or. 2002); accord State v. McGriff, 871 P.2d 782, 790 (Haw. 1994). 
 160 See supra note 3. 
 161 Mosteller, supra note 136, at 411, 414-16. 
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facilitating the confrontation required by Crawford, rather 
than disputing the need for it.162 
Our last essayist, Laurence Busching, was the attorney-
in-charge of domestic violence and child abuse prosecutions 
brought by the New York County District Attorney’s Office for 
four years.163  He opens by discussing the reasons for the 
practical and evidentiary strategies employed by the 
Manhattan District Attorney’s Office in its pre-Crawford 
efforts to prosecute successfully extremely difficult domestic 
abuse and child abuse cases.164 
According to Mr. Busching, the post-Crawford 
predictions of serious and disastrous difficulties in so-called 
“evidence-based”165 prosecutions, i.e., without the victim’s in-
court testimony, have not yet come to pass in New York.166  
These difficulties have not occurred because New York courts 
have often characterized hearsay statements in domestic 
violence and child abuse cases as excited utterances, present 
sense impressions, and statements to medical doctors for 
purposes of diagnosis and treatment.  Because declarants 
usually make such statements informally and without 
awareness of prosecutorial use, these statements are not 
testimonial.167  However, Mr. Busching acknowledges that some 
convictions have been rendered more difficult because other 
kinds of victim hearsay statements have been held to be 
testimonial.168 
In the aftermath of Crawford, Mr. Busching notes that 
prosecutorial self-examination has prompted the contemplation 
of new strategies, including increased attention to the recovery 
of physical evidence and to the memorialization of the injuries 
suffered by the victim.169  Statements from the suspect-abusers 
  
 162 Lininger, supra note 148, at 408-09. 
 163 See Laurence Busching, Rethinking Strategies for Prosecution of Domestic 
Violence in the Wake of Crawford, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 391 (2005). 
 164 See id. at 393-95. 
 165 Some prosecutors are unhappy with this characterization because all 
prosecutions are evidence-based, regardless of who does or does not testify.  See 
Andrew Seewald, Evidence-Based Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases After 
Crawford v. Washington: A Greatly Exaggerated Death, EMPIRE STATE PROSECUTOR, 
Spring 2005, at 28. 
 166 Busching, supra note 163, at 396; accord Seewald, supra note 165, at 29.  
But see Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 820 
app. 1 (2005) (California, Oregon and Washington reported a post-Crawford increase in 
dismissals of domestic violence cases). 
 167 Busching, supra note 163, at 397. 
 168 See id. 
 169 See id. 
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themselves, obtained after full Miranda warnings, are another 
important source of evidence; such statements were not always 
sought from defendants in the pre-Crawford era.170  Also, 
prosecutors had started to use imaginatively the forfeiture 
doctrine even before Crawford.  That might now be especially 
important in domestic violence cases, when the unavailability 
of the declarant is the direct result of conduct by or 
attributable to the defendant.171 
Mr. Busching also thinks that Crawford may prompt 
prosecutors to reconsider whether to compel domestic violence 
victims to testify.  He further believes that, in order to protect 
against the risk of recantations on the stand by understandably 
frightened victims, it may be necessary to explore amending 
New York’s strict statutory evidentiary limitation on the kinds 
of statements that a party (usually the prosecution) may use to 
impeach its own witness.172 
Finally, given Crawford’s holding that there is no bar to 
the testimonial hearsay of a declarant who testifies at trial, Mr. 
Busching ruminates about whether it would be 
confrontationally sufficient simply to produce the declarant or 
otherwise make him or her available to be called for cross-
examination by the defendant.173 
  
 170 See id. at 397-98. 
 171 See id. at 398.  See, e.g., People v. Santiago, No. 2725-02, 2003 N.Y. Misc. 
LEXIS 829, *1-2, *51-52 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (defendant’s pattern of abusing his wife 
over a period of many years had clearly, convincingly and intentionally assured her 
unavailability, even before the charged crimes of contempt and violations of orders of 
protection had been committed). 
 172 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.35 (A witness called by a party in a 
criminal case, who elicits from that witness testimony upon a material issue, tending to 
disprove the calling party’s position, may be impeached by the calling party through 
the introduction of a prior written statement signed by the witness, or by the witness’s 
oral statement under oath contradicting the witness’s trial testimony.  The statute 
expressly provides that the prior statements are not admissible for substantive proof.  
When the witness’s testimony does not tend to disprove the calling and eliciting party’s 
case, the prior statements are not admissible but can be used to refresh the witness’s 
recollection, provided that the contents of the statement are not disclosed to the jury.). 
 173 Busching, supra note 163, at 400; see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 
60 n.9 (2004) (“[W]hen the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the 
Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial 
statements . . . .  The Clause does not bar admission of a statement as long as the 
declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it.”).  In his symposium essay, 
Professor Mosteller offers a reasoned conclusion that the confrontation right is not 
satisfied by the prosecutor simply producing or otherwise making the victim available 
to be called by defendants.  See Mosteller, supra note 136, at 416-17; see also State v. 
Snowden, 867 A.2d 314, 332-33 (Md. 2005). 
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FINAL THOUGHTS 
Before Crawford, the Supreme Court last addressed a 
Confrontation Clause hearsay issue in the 1999 case Lilly v. 
Virginia.174  There, the Court unanimously reversed a Virginia 
Supreme Court that had rejected a confrontation challenge to 
the admission of a nontestifying accomplice’s custodial 
confession to the police.  The rationale for reversal was 
supported only by a plurality opinion,175 which was 
accompanied by four other separate concurring opinions.176 
Remarkably, only five years later, a seven justice 
majority in Crawford spoke with one voice, that of Justice 
Scalia.  By examining the text of the Confrontation Clause, 
particularly the word witnesses, English history and common 
law (perhaps too much), pre-ratification American history 
(perhaps not enough), the practices that most concerned the 
Framers, the articulation of that concern during the 
ratification process and the modern day equivalent of those 
practices, Justice Scalia paints a simple but persuasive portrait 
of the majority’s vision of the confrontation right and its 
relationship to hearsay.  That vision is well-captured and 
persuasive regardless of the name given to the interpretative 
approach followed. 
Though hardly necessary to its holding, the Crawford 
majority at times seems to play a little too fast and loose with 
English common law to tell a story that comports fully with its 
view of the limitations placed on the introduction of hearsay by 
the Confrontation Clause.  Nevertheless, much to its credit, the 
Crawford majority focuses on statements secured by law 
enforcement interrogation of individuals who respond with 
testimony-bearing statements.  The introduction of such 
statements at trial and the defendant’s inability to cross-
examine the absent declarant are a core concern of the 
Confrontation Clause.  Thus, centering analysis on practices 
  
 174 Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999). 
 175 See id. at 120, 134, 137-38 (Stevens, J., for plurality; joined by Souter, 
Ginsburg & Breyer, J.J.) (custodial statements of a nontestifying accomplice that 
petitioner committed the charged murder were neither within a firmly rooted hearsay 
exception, nor possessed of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness). 
 176 Id. at 140 (Breyer, J. concurring); id. at 143 (Scalia, J. concurring in part 
and in the judgment); id. at 143; (Thomas, J., concurring in part and in the judgment); 
id. at 144 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment; joined by O’Connor & Kennedy, 
J.J.). 
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that are modern-day counterparts to the abuses targeted by the 
Clause is particularly appropriate. 
The wisdom of the testimonial approach 
notwithstanding, every question or group of questions does not 
necessarily constitute an interrogation, nor is every answer to 
a question necessarily a testimonial statement.  This caveat 
aside, the categorical exclusion of testimonial statements 
absent cross-examination of the declarant surely should prove 
a more principled, and less subjective approach than, and 
without the “unpardonable vice” of, the Roberts indicia of 
reliability framework. 
The twenty months since Crawford have seen untold 
numbers of reported and unreported state and federal cases 
struggling over the meaning of “testimonial.”  Indeed, some 
observers may have started to wonder whether “testimonial” 
will turn out to be as vague and malleable as the Roberts 
“reliability” framework.  The difficulty with the testimonial 
concept had been presaged at oral argument in Crawford.  
While exploring the definitional scope of “testimonial” with 
Crawford’s counsel, Justice O’Connor rhetorically remarked, 
“[W]hy buy a pig in a poke.”177  Whatever the Court has bought 
or wrought will be on display as it considers and decides two 
state Crawford cases in which certiorari was granted on 
October 31, 2005.178 
The articles and essays that follow are scholarly, 
enlightening, thoughtful, thought-provoking, and even 
amusing.  They provide a well-rounded read by which to 
explore the meaning and scope of the many issues presented by 
Crawford, and a perfect introduction to whatever comes next. 
After the “Crawford and Beyond” Conference, this 
wonderful Symposium Issue of the Law Review, and the two 
cases in which a decision can be expected by the end of the 
2005 term, we can look forward to “Crawford and Beyond: 
Revisited.” 
  
 177 Transcript of Oral Argument, 2003 WL 22705281, at *14, Crawford, 541 
U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410). 
 178 See State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005) (a hysterical, crying 
declarant’s description of how and by whom she had just been assaulted given to a 911 
operator is not testimonial), cert. granted, No. 05-5224 (U.S. Oct. 31, 2005), available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/103105pzor.pdf at 3; Hammon v. 
State, 829 N.E. 2d 444 (Ind. 2005) (a “somewhat frightened” woman’s description of 
physical abuse by her husband made to police officers responding to a reported 
domestic disturbance is not testimonial), cert. granted, No. 05-5705 (U.S. Oct. 31, 
2005), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/103105pzor.pdf 
at 3. 
